The Swedish Pension System and the Economic Crisis by Annika Sundén
December 2009, Number 9-25
THE SWEDISH PENSION SYSTEM AND THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
* Annika Sundén is Chief of the Pension Unit at the Swedish Social Insurance Agency and a Research Associate at the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Introduction 
The steep drop in financial markets in 2008 coupled 
with the ongoing economic recession pose immediate 
challenges for some public pension systems, par-
ticularly those that rely partly on equity investments.  
In the case of Sweden, the crisis provides an initial 
‘stress test’ for a major pension system reform imple-
mented earlier this decade.  The new system created 
by the reform was designed to be fiscally sustainable 
by including automatic adjustment mechanisms to 
maintain balance in response to short-term economic 
and financial fluctuations and long-term demographic 
changes.  Last fall’s plummeting stock market pro-
duced a decline in Sweden’s pension reserve funds 
and triggered a first-time automatic reduction in the 
pension indexation scheduled to occur in 2010.  In 
response, policymakers decided to spread out the 
required adjustment over a longer period.
This brief is organized as follows.  The first section 
describes how the Swedish pension system is de-
signed to maintain fiscal stability.  The second section 
documents trends in the system’s financial status.  
The third section explores the potential impact of 
the economic crisis on pension benefits under the 
system’s original rules.  The fourth section describes 
the policy response.  The final section concludes that 
even automatic adjustments may produce offsetting 
political considerations.
Structure of the System
The Swedish pension system, which has a total contri-
bution rate of 18.5 percent, has two components.  The 
first, and major, component is a pay-as-you-go Notion-
al Defined Contribution (NDC) plan, which receives 
16 percentage points of contributions.  The second 
component is an individual account, the Premium 
Pension, which receives the remaining 2.5 percentage 
points (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Swedish Pension System











Several characteristics contribute to the financial 
stability of the NDC plan.  Benefits are linked to 
lifetime contributions; the account balance grows 
with annual contributions and the rate of return on 
the account.  The rate of return on NDC accounts is 
set equal to per-capita real wage growth to link earned Center for Retirement Research 2
pension rights to earnings of the working population.  
At retirement, the account balance is converted to an 
annuity by an annuity divisor that automatically ties 
benefits to changes in life expectancy.  In addition, the 
system has a balancing mechanism that adjusts NDC 
benefits if the plan’s financial position deteriorates. 
Financial stability in the NDC is measured by the 
balance ratio, which relates the system’s assets to its 
liabilities (see Figure 2).  System assets consist of the 
capitalized value of contributions and the current 
value of the system’s reserve, or “buffer funds.”1  Pen-
sion liabilities are the system’s current vested liabili-
ties.  Contribution assets and pension liabilities are 
calculated using a three-year moving average, while 
the buffer funds are valued on December 31 of the 
year for which the balance ratio is calculated. 
Figure 2. Balance Ratio (BR) for Sweden’s NDC 
Pension Plan
Source: Author’s illustration. 




A balance ratio of one means that the NDC system 
is in financial balance (i.e., assets and liabilities are 
equal).  When the balance ratio is below one, the sys-
tem is in imbalance and liabilities exceed assets.   
In the short run, employment growth is the most 
important factor for stability, as it directly affects the 
system’s annual contributions and thereby system 
assets.  But the performance of the stock market also 
matters, since about 60 percent of the buffer funds 
is invested in equities.  In the long run, demographic 
factors, such as life expectancy, matter the most.  
When financial instability occurs, the balanc-
ing mechanism is activated automatically (to avoid 
depending on political decisions to restore financial 
balance).  Balance is restored by reducing per-capita 
wage indexation of earned pension rights for current 
workers and reducing the indexation of benefits for 
current retirees.  The reduced indexation continues 
until the system has regained financial balance.  
Any surpluses that occur after balancing are used to 
increase indexation until the value of pension credits 
and benefits are restored, as illustrated in Figure 3.  
So the intention is to temporarily adjust benefits in 
response to short-term fluctuations in the economy, 
while keeping benefits stable over the long run.
Figure 3. Illustration of How Balancing 
Mechanism Works
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Financial Stability 2002-2008
Table 1 on the next page shows the development 
of the system for the period 2002-2008.  The bal-
ance ratio was close to 1.0 through 2007.  In 2008, 
the balance ratio fell – for the first time – below 1.0.  
The main reason for the large deficit was the sharp 
decrease in equity prices during the fall of 2008.  The 
buffer funds experienced a negative return of 21.3 
percent.2
    
Automatic Adjustments
The economic crisis affects both components of the 
Swedish system, the NDC and the Premium Pension, 
but the main impact will be felt by current retirees, 
through changes in the indexation of their NDC 
benefits.3
Indexation of NDC pension benefits occurs on 
January 1 each year.  Benefits are adjusted by the 
change in average wage growth minus a growth norm 
of 1.6 percent.4  A deficit in the system affects index-
ation with a lag, so the financial crisis will not affect 
NDC benefits until 2010.  The balance ratio for 2008 
was calculated in the spring of 2009, approved by the 
government in the fall of 2009, and will be applied to 
indexation in January 2010.  Thus, the adjustment of 
pension benefits in 2009 is not affected by the finan-
cial crisis, and benefits have increased by 4.5 percent.
Under the original rules, the 2008 balance ratio 
was 0.9672, which means that indexation in 2010 
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or 3.3 percent.  Average wage growth has been very 
slow due to the recession, so even before balancing 
is applied, benefits were scheduled to decrease by 1.3 
percent.  Balancing reduces this level further so that 
the net effect on benefits would have been a decline of 
4.6 percent (see top panel of Table 2). 
Due to the recession following the financial crisis, 
employment in Sweden is projected to decrease dur-
ing 2009 and 2010, putting further pressure on the 
pension system.  Originally, the projected 2009 bal-
ance ratio of 0.9655 would have resulted in a further 
decrease in the indexation of benefits in 2011 of 3.5 
percent; because the outlook for wage growth has 
improved somewhat, the net effect on benefits would 
have been a reduction of 1.7 percent.  With current 
projections, indexation would turn positive again in 
2012.     
Balancing clearly has a significant affect on the 
NDC benefit.  Beneficiaries without income-related 
benefits or with low NDC benefits can qualify for 
the minimum guarantee benefit.  Approximately 43 
percent of Sweden’s retirees have some guarantee 
benefit.  When the NDC benefit is reduced, guaran-
tee benefits will increase for beneficiaries with both 
benefits.  Thus, the net effect on total benefits will be 
less for this group. 
Policy Response
Given the large effect of the economic crisis on the 
NDC plan, policymakers have begun to respond.  The 
balance ratio was published in March 2009 and, 
almost immediately, the five political parties that 
stand behind the pension reform – known as the Pen-
sion Group – started to discuss whether to propose 
smoothing the adjustment of pension benefits (+4.5 
in 2009 and -4.6 in 2010).  In particular, the group 
discussed if it was reasonable that the stock market 
crash should affect NDC benefits so much.  The 
Pension Group suggested that, instead of using the 
market value of the buffer funds, a three-year average 
should be used to value the funds.  As a result, the 
deficit would be spread out over time with a smaller 
decrease in 2010 but a larger decrease in 2011 and 
2012 (see bottom panel of Table 2). 
During the official review of the proposed change, 
several agencies remarked that using a three-year av-
erage to value the buffer funds means that the balance 
ratio will be a less accurate measure of the system’s 
financial stability.  Moreover, the effect on reducing 
the variation in benefits is limited and a temporary 
downturn in the stock market will continue affecting 
Table 1. Financial Status of Sweden’s NDC Plan, 2002-2008, Billions of Swedish Crowns
    2002          2003          2004          2005         2006         2007          2008
Buffer funds  488 577 646 796 858 898 707
Contribution assets 5,301 5,465 5,607 5,712 5,945 6,116 6,477
Total assets 5,789 6,042 6,253 6,490 6,803 7,014 7,184
Pension liabilities 5,729 5,984 6,244 6,461 6,703 6,996 7,428
Balance ratio 1.0105 1.0097 1.0014 1.0044 1.0149 1.0026 0.9672
Source: Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2008).
Table 2. Projected NDC Pension Benefits, 2009-2012
Source: Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2009).
       2009                2010                 2011                    2012
Original rules
   Balance ratio (t-2) 1.0026 0.9672 0.9655 0.9860
   Indexation without balancing  4.5 -1.3 1.8 2.2
   Balancing - -3.3 -3.5 -1.4
   Net effect on pension benefits  - -4.6 -1.7 0.8
New rules; three-year average of the buffer funds
   Balance ratio - 0.9826 0.9553 0.9743







% % %benefits even after it has ended.  However, the govern-
ment, with the support of the Pension Group, decided 
to go forward with the change.  Parliament passed the 
legislation in October 2009.  
Conclusion
The economic crisis has provided a stress test for 
Sweden’s new pension system.  As designed, the auto-
matic adjustments are kicking in to maintain finan-
cial balance in the system, with NDC pension benefits 
scheduled to decline by about 3 percent in 2010 and 
2011 – a result that reflects recent policy changes.  
The policy changes moderate the effect on system 
stability following the sharp stock market decline by 
using a three-year average to value the buffer funds, a 
change that spreads out the required adjustment over 
a somewhat longer period. 
 
Endnotes
1  The capitalized value of contributions is equal to 
the pension benefits that the annual contributions 
could finance in the long run.  It is derived by multi-
plying annual contributions by the turnover duration, 
which is the expected average time between when a 
contribution is made to the system and when the ben-
efit payment based on that contribution is expected to 
be made.  The current turnover duration is approxi-
mately 31.7 years.  
2  Another factor affecting the outcome is that the 
contribution assets increased more slowly than pen-
sion liabilities because of shorter turnover duration.
3  The bulk of the funded Premium Pension accounts 
are invested in equities and thus affected by the stock 
market crash.  In contrast to the NDC, accounts will 
be affected in 2009.  The rate of return in 2009 was 
-34.5 percent.  However, benefit payments from the 
Premium Pension are still modest (on average 150 
SEK per month compared with a typical NDC benefit 
of 12,000 SEK per month) so the effect on current 
beneficiaries will be small.
4  The growth norm is deducted since it is included 
in the annuity divisor; the initial benefit at retirement 
is thus higher than if benefits were adjusted fully for 
economic growth each year.  
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